In the last 30 years, chain businesses have become dominant in many industries.
online review and rating websites have allowed consumers to document and share their experiences with almost every conceivable type of firm.
5 Many industries are therefore transitioning from a very low to relatively high information environment, and the path this transition will take depends on what has driven the chain model's success to this point.
It is ultimately an empirical question to what extent efficiency or information asymmetries is driving the success of chains. This paper will use a unique firm level dataset on the hotel industry to examine empirically the nature of chain affiliation and the relative contribution of each factor to firm profits. Two features of this data are particularly useful.
I observe the full population of firms, this allows a direct comparison between chain affiliated and independent firms rather than simply relying on observations of a single chain like
McDonald's or Walmart. In addition, I observe firm revenue, making it possible to separate demand side factors from cost side factors. This data is supplemented with online reviews data and market level demand shifters.
The lodging industry is an ideal setting to examine the questions presented above for several reasons. First, hotels compete in a large number of geographically distinct markets.
Second, unlike retailers or firms in other service industries, they offer close to a single product, a night's stay in a room. This product is differentiated between firms almost entirely on universally agreed on quality and not other factors. These result in a relatively straightforward problem with few confounding factors. Third, the trend towards chain firms in this industry closely matches the aggregate trend. Economic Census, and franchises were responsible for $1.3 trillion sales (9.2% of GDP) and 7.9 million employed (Kosova and Lafontaine (2012) ).
The empirical strategy I pursue takes two parts. The first is a reduced form examination of hotel revenue and the value of chain affiliation. This includes examining the impact on revenues of hotels that add or drop affiliation during the sample period. I find that conditional on firm and market characteristics, chain affiliated properties earn over 20% higher revenue per room than independent firms. I then examine the nature of this advantage and find it to be consistent with a variety of predictions of a model of low consumer information 5 According to the Local Consumer Review Survey 2012, 85% of consumers checked online reviews before making purchasing decisions in 2012.
6 This can be seen by comparing Figures 1 and 7.
as opposed to other potential explanations. The chain premium declines over the past decade as online reputation mechanisms become more widely used. The chain premium appears immediately when a firm joins a chain, as opposed to slowly phasing in, and it is positively correlated with chain size, as a model of repeat interactions would predict. Finally, online reviews data show strong correlations between customer information and independent firm success and among firms with large numbers of online reviews the chain premium disappears completely.
I next examine the conventional explanation that chain affiliated firms are more efficient than independent firms by examining their operating costs. These costs are unobserved, instead I estimate a dynamic model in the style of Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) to recover the cost structure of the different firm types to examine what cost or efficiency advantage is associated with chain affiliation. Briefly, the identification strategy is to take observed revenues and observed entry and exit decisions and find the set of costs that best rationalize them in the context of a firm level discrete choice problem. The dynamic model produces realistic estimates of firm operating costs. They suggest, however, that chain firms gain no cost advantage from their affiliation after controlling for quality and unobserved market level heterogeneity. This model can then be used to test the dynamic effects of policies limiting chain firms of the sort proposed in various jurisdictions. 7 I solve the model using the estimated parameters and run counterfactual simulations under a range of policies restricting chain entry. These suggest that limitations on chain firms result in fewer total firms in equilibrium and lower quality firms on average.
A growing literature addresses the spread of chains. In part this reflects the success of large retailers such as Wal-Mart (Basker (2005) , Foster et al. (2006) , Holmes (2011) and Jia (2008) ). This literature also takes advantage of newly developed methods to estimate structural models of competition from entry and location decisions, including Thomadsen (2005) , Toivanen and Waterson (2005) , and Aguirregabiria (2009) on fast-food; Davis (2006) on movie theatres; Seim (2006) on video rental stores; and Villas-Boas (2007) on supermarkets; and Suzuki (2013) and Mazzeo (2002) on hotels. These papers consider entry and location decisions, sometimes combined with structural demand models, and study their implications on firms' underlying cost structures and the nature of competition. Suzuki (2013) uses the same data source as this paper and similar methods in a study 7 For instance, San Francisco bans firms with more than 11 outlets from operating in many areas. Other examples are discussed in section 4.
of land-use regulations.
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A great deal of work has also been done in the vertical integration and franchising literature on why and when chain firms own and manage their own outlets and when they franchise them out. Kosova and Lafontaine (2012) and Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) summarize the state of this literature. This vertical decision is interesting but is in many respects secondary to the initial horizontal spread of the chain structure and the underlying motivation thereof, which this literature approaches only indirectly. In addition, no previous work considers the demand side explanation for chain affiliation and how asymmetric information may be driving organizational form patterns.
Mazzeo (2004) is one of the few studies that considers the same margin as this paper, the firm's decision of whether or not to join a chain. That paper also considers the hotel industry.
Using cross-sectional data on hotel locations in rural markets, he finds that chain affiliation is positively correlated with a measure of economic uncertainty and is more common in markets off major highways. He interprets this as potentially resulting from different shares of repeat business customers, where fewer repeat business customers increases the importance of chain affiliation, although it is difficult to say in general how the customer composition varies over highway markets and non-highway markets without data on the subject. One notable recent work that also studies the effect of online reviews on firm outcomes is Luca (2011) , who studies the effects of Yelp.com reviews on Seattle restaurants. He finds reviews primarily effect independent restaurants and that during the time period studied chain restaurant market share is declining.
The rest of this paper will contain as follows: section 1 will describe the data and examine the revenue effects of chain affiliation, section 2 will develop a dynamic model and empirical strategy, and section 3 presents results from this model.
Revenue Analysis
In this section I will document a revenue premium associated with chain affiliation and argue that this premium is sufficient evidence of market power.
9 Ideally, we would observe prices and quantities directly, but only data on overall revenue are available and thus demand cannot be estimated, and in any event there is generally no single price for a hotel room.
Prices vary over the time of year, day of week, and even method of purchase. I instead focus on a firm revenue to measure performance,which is the measure most widely used in the industry. In a review of similarly rated hotels located in the same market, I observe that unaffiliated hotels almost never charge higher prices than comparable chain hotels.
Conditional on quality and other factors, if chain prices are weakly higher than unaffiliated prices, higher revenue implies either prices are higher or greater capacity is filled despite similar prices. Both imply greater market power.
Data
The state of Texas collects a hotel occupancy tax. Consequently, the full quarterly revenues of all Texas lodging establishments is available from the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. Tax revenue data is particularly trustworthy because incorrectly reporting it is considered unlawful tax evasion. 10 For each hotel I also collect location, capacity and a measure of age. This information, along with chain affiliation, was cross checked with a number of sources including the AAA Tourbook published each year and various hotels booking websites. The AAA Tourbook also provides a standardized measure of quality, giving a rating of 1 through 4 stars for each hotel listed. Of the hotels in our sample, 57% of affiliated firms have been rated. 11 My analysis focuses on rural markets, in which the bulk of hotels are one or two stars. The full distribution of star ratings breaks down as follows:
52.9% one star or unrated, 28.9% two stars, 17.9% three stars, and 0.2% four stars.
I also collect data from TripAdvisor.com, the world's largest travel review website. Users rate firms on a 5 star scale and leave detailed reviews. I use a December 2012 cross-section containing average user rating, the number and distribution of reviews, each firm's ranking within their market, and the number of reviews by reviewer type (business, family, etc.) I also calculate the standard deviation of user ratings from the ratings distribution.
10 The unit of analysis throughout this paper is at the level of the individual property. Similarly, I define "firm" throughout at the level of the property because hotels are almost universally owned and managed by independent franchisees in these data.
11 As AAA does not rate firms below a minimum quality standard, unrated firms are assigned a score of 1 star. For unrated chain affiliated firms, I assign the modal star rating of its chain partners. There is very little within chain variation in star ratings. For almost all the analysis that follows, I have examined the results when using only the set of AAA rated firms to test the importance of this assumption and in no case are the results significantly different.
The analysis here is largely restricted to rural markets, where a market is defined as rural if there is no other market within 20 miles of it.
1213 This is for three reasons. First, large cities contain a very large number of hotels. These hotels are more horizontally differentiated in a number of unobservable ways, some cater to business travelers, others to recreational, and within a large, sprawling city such as Houston, location is a key attribute. It is not necessarily clear, therefore, which firms are competing with whom, and thus how to define a market. More importantly, there is probably a large degree of unobserved heterogeneity.
Second, hotel chains often own and operate a small number of their properties themselves.
These are concentrated in large markets, whereas in rural markets nearly 100% of chain hotels are franchised out. This matters because chain affiliation will be assumed to be endogenous at the level of the hotel for some of what follows. 14 Fortunately, Texas contains a great many rural and isolated markets. After restricting attention to these markets, our sample contains 353 markets with 1465 hotels. The mean market had 2 chain and 2.77 independent hotels active in 2012. As seen in Figure 7 , the Texas rural hotel industry displays the same dynamics seen nationally.
The measure of performance I will focus on is daily revenue per available room, or "RevPar". This is computed simply as revenue divided by capacity and the number of days.
For much of what follows I use annual means, aggregating up from quarterly, because of large seasonal fluctuations in demand and because most market data are annual. For the full sample, mean chain RevPar is $32.07 and mean independent RevPar is $19.07. Summary statistics can be seen in Table 4 . The physical distribution of chain and independent firms is mapped in Figure 2 , with excluded counties highlighted.
Data show that along with being more likely to have a high quality rating, chain affiliated hotels are more likely to be active in larger and more attractive markets. To account for demand side factors that influence firm revenue and market structure, I collect data on each market. From the Census Bureau I collect data on county unemployment rate and 12 For all results that follow, I define market as nearest city but also include firms in the same county among potential competitors. In addition, because hotel customers are frequently highway travelers, there is still potential substitution across markets. As a result, for markets on major highways I test inclusion of the firms in adjacent counties as potential competitors. I find that including them has no significant effect on results.
13 Excluded markets are highlighted in Figure 2 14 The organizational structure of chain affiliated hotels can vary. In some cases, the chain both owns and operates the property, in other cases a franchisee owns the property but the chain has a contract to manage it. In nearly all firms in this sample, the chain neither owns nor operates the property. Instead, these roles are taken by local franchisees and the chain simply licenses its branding and provides the franchisee with a operating manual. population, and total county retail sales as measures of market size or business activity. From the Texas Railroad Commission I add data on the number of currently producing wells for both oil and natural gas in each county. I also gather Texas Department of Transportation data on average daily traffic passing through each market. This measure is a key determinant of demand in the rural roadside hotel industry. Summary statistics on these data can be seen in Table 1 . Together, variation across time and markets in these factors should help capture exogenous shifts in demand. In particular, the growth of the natural gas industry in Texas over the past decade has had a significant impact on hotel demand and is clear exogenous to hotel performance. Examples of this impact on revenue and entry patterns will be described below.
Revenue Estimates
In this section, I show that chain firms earn a substantial revenue premium over otherwise identical independent firms. Table 4 shows that, on average, chain firms earn higher revenues, but this could reflect a number of factors. To test if chain affiliated firms earn a revenue premium after controlling for firm and market characteristics, I regress RevPar on these market specific factors as well as the number of chain and independent competitors in the market. Specifically, I consider the model
where x imt are data on market characteristics such as population, as well as the number and type of competitors in each market, f irm it are other firm characteristics such as AAA rating and TripAdvisor.com rating, c it indicates whether a firm is a member of a chain in period t, and market and time are year and market dummies. The ultimate object of interest is δ c , which is the remaining effect on revenue of chain affiliation after controlling for firm and market characteristics.
While market structure variables are endogenous with respect to the same demand conditions that partially determine revenue, I am not concerned with this causing bias in estimation. Opening or closing a firm is a long term decision with new firms having a time to build of over a year. As a result, short term fluctuations in demand conditions should have little effect on market structure. I also include market fixed effects, so highly persistent unobserved demand conditions are accounted for. To control for medium term fluctuations, I include the aforementioned six demand shifters as wells as two variables measuring their rates of change.
With year dummies omitted for space, results are shown in Table 4 . Because the dependent variable here is RevPar, coefficients can be interpreted as the effect on dollars per room per day.
After controlling for quality and other factors, we see that affiliating with a national chain is associated with an average premium of $5.78 of daily RevPar. This represents a 27.7% premium, or roughly $120, 000 per year for a firm with 50 rooms.
Switchers
There is an important potential sources of bias in the above analysis. Chain affiliation may be correlated with unobserved factors that increase revenue. This would be true, for instance, if chain hotels were more likely to be built on the best locations. This would cause upward bias in the estimate of the chain premium.
Our concerns about bias in revenue estimates stem from the fact that chain and unaffiliated hotels may differ systematically in unobservable ways. Ideally we could measure the counterfactual revenues of the same hotels with and without a chain affiliation. While this is impossible, 104 hotels do add or drop chain affiliation in the sample period. 15 Here, I
measure the effect of this change on revenue in a firm fixed effects context. The econometric model for RevPar that I consider is:
where a i is an unobserved, time-invariant determinant of revenue. Our concern is that a i is correlated with c it . Because we observe switchers, I can estimate a de-meaned version of equation 2 to eliminate a i and estimate δ c off the subpopulation of switchers. No firms that add or drop chain affiliation change their star rating, indicating that switches occur within fairly well-defined quality tiers, rather than accompanying a significant change in underlying firm quality. Along with superficial changes in branding, joining a chain requires following a set of standardized operating procedures.
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Results from this estimation are in column 3 of Table 4 . Time constant explanatory variables are eliminated, and most estimates are similar to the previous results. The FE regression provides an estimate of the chain premium of $4.35, lower than the estimate without firm fixed effects, but still a substantial advantage. This is equivalent to a 21.1% premium or roughly $95, 000 per year.
By adding dummies for the number of years before or after the switch occurred, we can trace out the timing of the revenue boost switchers receive and test whether the chain premium results from selection on a trend in unobservables. This would be the case, for instance, if chains were dropping underperforming firms or adding independent firms that had recently improved their quality. If this were the case, a one year lead of the switch should pick up this reverse effect and eliminate the estimated chain premium. I perform tests of this sort in Table 8 . In column 4, we see the coefficient on a one year lead of joining a chain is positive but not statistically significant and when it is included the chain premium is $4.07 and highly significant.
I show the full set of leads and lags visually in Figure 3 . Two things stand out: first, there is no increase in revenue associated as firm approaches adding a chain affiliation, and thus the chain premium is not just a product of national chains selecting high quality firms to allow into their chain or vice versa. Second, the chain premium shows up at its mean level immediately, it does not need time to phase in. This result is consistent with the chain premium being caused by low consumer information. Under that explanation, as soon as the chain sign is raised, the advantage should be present. Table 4 presents results from a comparison of revenues for only the quarter before a switch occurs and the quarter after it occurs for firms adding or dropping chain affiliation. The estimated chain premium falls slightly, to $3.51, but is still close to the mean value in the sample containing all periods.
This is further evidence that the premium appears immediately and does not result from quality improvements that phase in over time. This chain premium is the average over the 12 years in the sample. We can also look at how the revenue premium varies from year to year by interacting chain with year dummies.
If the chain premium results from market power derived from low information, one might expect to see it decline over the past decade as information available to consumers online has improved. 17 The results can be seen in Figure 4 . The chain revenue premium, expressed as a percentage, steadily decreases over the decade, from around 30% in 2002 to about 15% in 2012.
18 This decrease suggests the advantage to operating as a chain is fading, and potentially is evidence that online reputation mechanisms that have developed over the past decade are part of the reason why.
Sources of Chain Advantage
The previous section has documented that chains earn a revenue premium of over 20%
after controlling for firm and market characteristics, but can more be said about where this premium comes from? Theory suggests firms might use chain affiliation to gain market power by credibly signaling quality in low information settings. While it is impossible to observe how informed consumers are, this theory does suggest a variety of testable predictions.
Two of these have already been discussed. If the chain premium results from poor information, it should be declining over time, particularly since 2005, as online reputation mechanisms have developed and become an important part of the hotel industry. This is indeed the case, as Figure 4 demonstrates, the chain premium is significantly lower at the end of the decade than at the beginning. This result is robust to specifications of the competitive environment and does not seem to be business cycle related. If the chain premium were driven by use of loyalty programs, for instance, we would not see this fall, as loyalty programs have increased in use during this period.
Additionally, if chain affiliation serves as a signal of quality, the chain premium should appear immediately when a previously unaffiliated firm joins a chain. Figure 3 shows that this is the case. If the premium were driven by subtle improvements in quality or management, we would expect it to take time to phase in. If the premium were just about the informational value of the name and sign it should appear immediately, as it does. Note: This figure shows histograms of consumer ratings on TripAdvisor.com separated by firm type, where firm type is either chain or independent, and stars refer to AAA quality ratings.
erating firms in different markets with uniform standards of quality, increasing the potential for repeat interactions. The value of a chain's reputation should therefore depend on the number of potential interactions consumers can have with it. This prediction can be tested by testing the relationship between firm revenue and the number of chain outlets. The theory predicts a chain premium increasing in chain size. Results can be seen in Table 9 .
These estimates exclude independent firms. We see a strong, significant, positive correlation between chain size and the chain premium. This lends support to the information based market power hypothesis of chain success. This is the case overall and including firm level fixed effects. In this case I estimate the effect of chain size on firms that switch chains during the sample period. For these firms the effect is smaller but still significantly positive.
There is a potential selection bias in both of these results, but nevertheless we see that firms switching to larger chains see an increase in their revenue.
Next, I consider results from TripAdvisor.com customer reviews data. The number and The left chart presents the estimated chain premium in dollars on the y-axis, where the estimates are on samples truncated by only considering firms with a minimum number number of reviews, shown on the x-axis. The right chart shows the number of firms in each truncated sample.
consistency of online reviews can act as a measure of consumer information about different firms. While the number of reviews a firm receives is clearly endogenous, as it is a function of the firm's past history of demand shocks, the mean rating and standard deviation of ratings are not. These data are inherently subjective, however, as consumers ratings may relate to prior expectations, treating 4 star firms differently from 1 star firms, for instance.
So long as they do not treat chain and independent firms differently, this does not present a problem for any of our results. Table 2 shows summary statistics on reviews and Figure   5 shows their distribution. There appear to be no systematic differences in mean rating, standard deviation, or number of reviews between chain and independent firms. While I cannot measure the effect of number of reviews on revenue due to their endogeneity, we can still gain some information from them. I re-estimate the chain premium for the subset of firms for which the number of reviews is large. In Figure 6 , I display the estimated chain premium for a range of cut-off points. Below this is the number of firms of each type included in the truncated sample. We see that as the number of reviews increases, the resulting chain premium becomes statistically insignificant after 10 reviews and close to 0 after 20 reviews. This suggests that as the amount of information available to consumers increases, the chain premium might disappear completely, although there is a potential selection effect here as well. The most visited and reviewed firms could have unobservable characteristics affecting this result. I test this by performing the same analysis but truncating on traffic. age. and number of rooms and I do not find a similar pattern.
In this section I will describe the empirical strategy for recovering the cost structure of the industry. Why are we interested in these costs? I have already shown that organizing as a chain is associated with a significant revenue premium. This suggests that market power plays a role in the success of the chain model, but it does not give the full story. Whether chains also derive an efficiency or cost advantage from their affiliation matters for how we should think about them. If they do, and it is substantial, the implications for social welfare are different then if the only advantage derives from market power, and the implications for the future of the industry depends on whether chains will continue to thrive if the premium they are able to charge declines as consumers have access to greater information.
Unfortunately, these costs are not observable. Recovering them requires a structural model. Estimating this model serves another purpose, as well, in allowing for the counterfactual exercises used to consider policies restricting chain firms described in the next section.
This methodology follows a recent tradition in empirical work of using two stage methods to recover the structural parameters of settings of firm competition that can be characterized with observed revenues, it is possible to identify operating costs as the set of costs that best rationalize these two pieces of data.
19 These are the costs we are concerned with when considering the proposition that chain affiliated firm's success is due to economies of scale in inputs, advertising, technology, etc. In addition, it is well-known from prior work and
19 During the sample period 153 firms exit and 603 firms enter.
from the revenue estimation in section 1 that unobserved heterogeneity plays a large role in driving both revenue and profits, and so it is crucial to account for this in estimation. In this section I demonstrate one of the first applications of the method described in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) for allowing flexible unobserved heterogeneity in both revenue and costs and show that this makes an important difference in results.
Model
I model the hotel industry as a dynamic discrete game, where in each period firms compete against one another in local markets. The game is modeled following Ericson and Pakes (1998) . Each market contains a set of actors, differentiated along three dimensions: their quality type (1, 2, or 3 stars), whether or not they are affiliated with a chain, and whether they are an incumbent or a potential entrant. 20 Each firm in each period chooses whether or not to be active in the market and entrants determine their type. In addition to this, firms observe private information which they use in making their decision. Specifically, they observe a private signal about their profits in the coming year and use that signal in part when they decide whether or not to stay active. This signal can represent demand conditions, cost conditions, or both. This is modeled as a vector of one period, IID shock to profits, defined as it (a it ), where firm actions are represented by a it .
Time is discrete over an infinite horizon, and the timing is as follows. At the beginning of each period, all active firms draw their private payoff values it and decide whether or not to remain active in the market or exit irreversibly. At the same time, a set of potential entrants observe the state of the market x it and a draw of private values it and decide whether to enter the market or not. If they do not, they are replaced by a new set of potential entrants in the following period. 20 Because there is such a small number of 4 star firms, and none enter or exit during the sample period, I exclude them from this analysis.
Once these decisions have been made, firms compete and earn revenues R(x it , a it , a −i,t ; θ R ) and incur operating costs C(x it , a it ; θ C ).
21 The vectors (θ c C , θ R ) parameterize the cost and revenue functions. Note that while revenues depend on the actions of ones rivals, costs do not.
22 The private information component of payoffs is additively separable. Per period payoffs can thus be written:
At the time of entry, potential entrants jointly decide whether or not to affiliate or remain independent, and which quality level to operate at. When entering, the firm pays an entry cost, EC(c i , q i ), that is a function of quality and affiliation. For potential entrants, private information shocks help determine not just whether the firm will be active but also what type and quality level they will choose.
Throughout this paper, all decisions are assumed to be made by local business owners.
Despite operating under the brand of a national chain, that chain's headquarters makes neither the exit or entry decision. This is how the market operates in reality, with few exceptions. Hotels belonging to a chain must uphold certain quality standards and pay a share of revenues or flat franchise fee, but are otherwise independent. 23 This fact also results in a much simpler game than if a central body was making entry and exit decisions across a large number of markets. In reality, local entrepreneurs decide to open a hotel and then choose which chain to affiliate with, if any. While exclusive territory agreements given to existing franchisees may restrict this choice set, the number of potential chain partners is so high that this should not effect a new firm's overall type choice.
Equilibrium
Following Ericson and Pakes (1998), firms' entry and exit strategies are restricted to be anonymous, symmetric, and Markovian. Firms thus only consider the current state vector of payoff relevant variables when making their decisions and all firms facing the same state 21 I choose not to model the stage game that generates revenue, instead taking revenue as a flexible function of firm characteristics, market characteristics, and the number and type of competitors faced by each firm.
22 I model all costs as fixed costs. Industry analyses suggest that greater than 90% of costs are considered fixed.
23 In some cases, hotel chains do have centralized strategies with respect to entry, but the focus of these is on "showcase" hotels in large markets. In the rural markets I focus on here, the process is initiated and controlled by local entrepreneurs.
behave the same way. Denote their strategies σ i : (x i , i ) −→ a i . Given these strategies, the incumbent firm's problem can be summarized:
The value of being an incumbent in state (x i , i ) is either the value of exiting or continuing in the market, earning expected profits plus a continuation value, whichever is higher.
The choice of firm type is made is upon entry. Thus, entrants face a somewhat more complex problem. They make 3 decisions simultaneously, whether to enter, whether to operate as a chain or independently, and at what quality level. Let q i ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote quality level. The entrant's decision can be summarized:
The value of being a potential entrant in state (x i , i ) is the higher of the values of staying out or entering as a chain or unaffiliated firm of any quality level. Entering entails paying a cost that depends on type choice and then becoming an incumbent firm in the next period.
These firm value functions are indexed by the strategy functions σ(x), which firms use to forecast their rivals' behavior and their own future behavior. The strategies σ(x) form a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium if for all V (·) above and all possible alternativesσ(x):
The presence of private information guarantees the existence of of at least one pure strategy MPNE, as shown by Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) . There is no way to guarantee uniqueness, however.
Empirical Strategy
In this section I discuss the variables and assumptions I will use to take the above model to the data. Until recently, estimating the underlying parameters of dynamic discrete games has been considered too difficult to be practical. The reason is that solving for an equilibrium of the game is computationally demanding and must be done for every set of parameters considered in solving a maximum likelihood problem. Beginning with Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Bajari et al. (2007) , however, two step methods have been developed to avoid fully solving for equilibrium at every parametric evaluation. Instead, reduced form policy functions governing entry, exit and type choice are estimated directly from the data and are assumed to reflect equilibrium play. These are then used to estimate underlying structural parameters of the dynamic games.
The strategy followed here follows this tradition. Reduced form policy functions governing entry and exit are estimated and then these are used to estimate choice specific value functions directly. Re-solving the firm's discrete choice problem using estimated revenues
and future values allows us to recover per period costs.
Revenue Adjustments:
Two adjustments must be made to observed revenues at this stage. First, I subtract franchise fees paid by chain affiliated firms. In the previous results on revenue, I do not adjust for these fees. In that section I am primarily concerned with identifying and explaining a revenue premium earned by chain firms and am not interested in how this premium is divided between the franchisee and franchisor. In the current section I model the entry and exit decision of the franchisee and so it is necessary to remove these fees. Fortunately, hotel chains charge uniform fees across members and these are collected and published by Hotel Management, a trade publication. The standard contract consists of a flat initial fee ranging from $50, 000 to $100, 000 followed by 7 − 10% of revenue thereafter. The fixed costs I estimate in this section are thus the net costs before fees, or the underlying economic costs of operation.
Second, I adjust revenue for selection on entry and exit. We only observe the revenues of firms who do not exit and model the entry/exit process as a function of revenue shocks.
Revenue thus needs to be adjusted for selection on these shocks. This can be done using a control function approach as described in . Specifically, assuming the private component of revenue is distributed according to a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution, the expected value of this for active firms is
After making these adjustments, revenues are estimated mostly as described in previous sections with two differences. First, for the purposes of our second stage estimation, revenues are only estimated over the state variables of the dynamic discrete game, i.e. no market dummies. Second, to keep the specification flexible, I include quadratic terms on market characteristics and interactions between firm and market characteristics.
Policy Functions:
The first step is estimation of firm policy functions determining entry and exit decisions.
I assume the unobservable components i are distributed according to a Type 1 Extreme
Value (T1EV) distribution. Therefore, for incumbent firms, the choice probabilities thus take the logit form where: Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) show that under general conditions, this Conditional Choice Probability (CCP) is equivalent to the firm's policy function. The state x it includes the full state of the market, ie {n c q , n u q }∀q, as well as own type and market characteristics.
Value Function Inversion:
Here I describe how firm value functions are decomposed into revenue, cost and continuation values and how these continuation values are constructed using our estimates of policy functions. Because revenue is observable, once continuation values are estimated, it becomes straightforward to estimate the remaining piece, the firm's cost function.
First I give some notation. Denote the choice specific value function:
where V (x i ) is the value of being in state x i before realization of i draws, which I will refer to as the ex ante value function. I find it by integrating V (x i , i ) over the distribution of i .
The model implies:
If I continue to assume i is distributed T1EV, then the probability of remaining active is thus:
where the value of exit v(x i , 0) has been normalized to 0. Hotz and Miller (1993) provided the insight that specifying the choice in this way can allows us to invert the above equation
and write the choice specific value function as a function of estimable choice probabilities:
Using our first stage estimates of p(a i |x it ) from equation 8, I can thus form estimates of choice specific value functions directly off the data. I can also use our policy function estimates to calculate the conditional state transition function. Because private information shocks are assumed to be independent across firms, the probability distribution of a firm's rivals choosing a −it is P (a −i,t |x t ) = Π j =i p(a j,t |x t ). Denote the transition of the state vector
The transition kernel a firm thus faces is:
which can be calculated using our first stage policy function estimates and estimates of transition processes for exogenous state variables. Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) show how, due to the T1EV assumption on i , and due to the fact that exit is a terminal state, the ex ante value function can be expressed solely as a function of the CCP's. Because the probability of exit is a function of the relative values of exit and remaining active, all information about the value of being active is contained in the probability of exit at this state. Specifically,
where γ is Euler's Constant. 24 To simplify notation, I will refer to this item as:
which I can estimate directly from our CCP estimates by simulating over the distribution f (x i |x i , a i ) a large number of times and calculating ln(p(0|x i )) at each draw. The choice specific value function in equation 9 can now be written as
The structural form of the discrete choice problem in equation 8 can now be solved, offset with estimates of R(·), and used to find the parameters of the cost function. 25 The firm's discrete choice is solved with fitted revenues in the current state and the expected one period ahead value. This approach has the appeal of being computationally straightforward, and thus can accommodate a large number of state variables which would otherwise pose a significant computational burden.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
The preceding assumes there is no persistent unobserved heterogeneity across firms or markets. The reduced form estimates presented earlier, however, provide evidence of unobservables influencing key revenue parameters. It is important, therefore, to allow for this when estimating the structural model.
In general, it is difficult to account for persistent unobservable effects in dynamic game models due to the highly non-linear nature of estimators. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) show a method for accounting for permanent unobserved characteristics that influence payoffs in stationary dynamic games. Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) propose a method for estimating models with potentially time-varying unobservable factors that affect both payoffs and state transitions. This is the approach I follow here.
I assume markets are in some unobserved state s, drawn from a discrete, finite support S. The unobserved state can affect firm profits, firm choice probabilities, and other state transition probabilities included in x it , such as traffic or population. The algorithm iterates over two steps. In the first, the conditional probability of each observation being in each unobserved state is calculated using data and the assumptions of the model. In the second, these distributions are taken as given, and parameters governing payoffs and transitions are estimated conditional on them, treating them as weights.
In essence, in this procedure we are adding structure to what is unobserved by comparing what our model predicts with the outcome in the data. For example, if for market m, most firms in most periods earn revenues that are higher than their predicted value, and fewer firms exit than our model predicts, it indicates this market likely has a high value of the unobserved state.
Results
In this section I present estimates of firm operating costs as well as estimates of entry and exit behavior.
For incumbent firms, I estimate policy functions using logistic regression, where the dependent variable is whether or not the firm stays active, and the independent variables are market characteristics, firm characteristics, and interactions between them. 26 Reduced form estimates of an incumbent firm's probability of remaining active are presented in Table   10 . I test a variety of logit specifications as well as probit and poisson. We see that chains and higher quality firms are less likely to exit. Specification III, which includes quadratic and interaction terms, is used in what follows.
Entry is modeled as a flexible poisson process. Entrants of each firm type arrive at independent rates that vary with market characteristics. Results are shown in Table 11 .
While results differ across firm types, the two strongest predictors of entry for almost all firm types are natural gas production and interest rates. Markets whose existing firms are older on average also attract more entry. While entry rates are thus used to predict revenue and estimate operating costs, I do not estimate entry costs. Doing so requires making strong assumptions on the entry process and the number and types of potential entrants to achieve 26 I treat changes in chain affiliation status as exogenous. It is relatively straightforward to model this as endogenous. Doing so would not change estimates of operating cost and would merely allow estimation of sunk, fixed switching costs which are not the subject of this paper. In general, switches between chain and unaffiliated are not used in the structural estimation since only 4 switching firms subsequently exit. This is not enough to reliably identify the change in operating costs that might result from the switch.
identification. Because entry costs are not the subject of this paper I choose not to make these assumptions and do not estimate them as a result.
I estimate county unemployment rate, total sales, population, gas wells and traffic as independent AR (1) Table 3 . Results are for market random effects distributed over a uniformly spaced grid with 10 points. Increasing this number up to 100 was considered and showed little improvement. This table presents final stage estimates of firm operating costs, expressed in terms of dollars per room per day, with bootstrap standard errors. Chain size refers to the number of chain partners in Texas. Column I shows estimates without market level random effects. Columns II-V calculate market random effects using the Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) procedure.
To correspond to our earlier measure of RevPar, costs are presented in terms of dollars per room per day. Different functional form choices for policy functions and continuation values give nearly identical results.
27 Bootstrap standard errors appear below in parentheses. 28 As we expect, higher quality firms have correspondingly higher costs. Two star firms operating costs are roughly $7 higher per room per day than one star firms, and three star firms' costs are $23 higher per room per day. Fixed costs per room are also increasing slightly in number of rooms and traffic, although these are not statistically significant.
The most notable result is that chain firms have no significant cost advantage over independent firms, after conditioning on quality. Costs are estimated at around $.5 less and this is not statistically significant. If larger chains are better able to achieve economies of scale, we would expect that operating in a larger chain would result in lower costs.
Interacting chain status with dummies corresponding to chain size shows no significant evidence that operating in a larger chain lowers costs. Across many specifications, these results argue against the hypothesis that chains are successful because they are more efficient or productive than non-chain firms. An important methodological result is also seen by comparing column I, which does not control for market level unobserved heterogeneity, to columns II-V, which do. This changes not only the magnitude but the sign of the key parameter.
To gauge the accuracy of these results, on average, I turn to industry survey data on costs. Smith Travel Research is an independent research firm that operates a large database on hotel industry data, producing annual reports on RevPar, gross operating profits and operating costs of hotel firms. Their annual Hotel Operating Statistics Study combines data from roughly 6,100 hotels in the United States. In Table 13 , I present this summary data on average operating expenses for the limited service budget sector of hotels. The average reported daily per room operating cost is $31.00. For a 2-star chain firm, my estimates suggest an average daily cost of $30.32, $28.51, $31.18, $30.06, depending on specification.
The operating costs I estimate thus fit very closely with average survey responses.
27 See Table 12 which compares the resulting cost estimates using different first stage specifications of policy functions.
28 These are determined by drawing whole market histories from the set of 353 markets, with replacement, and repeating the full procedure described above 100 times.
Counterfactuals
Since the advent of chain retailers in the early 1900's, their success and the effect on independent firms has been controversial and calls for policies to restrict their activities. Today, policymakers in a variety of locations have implemented or are considering implementing restrictions on chain firms. The San Francisco, CA Planning Code bans or otherwise limits chain firms from operating in much of the city, and dozens of other U.S. cities have adopted similar measures. While they have done so for a variety of reasons which I do not attempt to address here, advocates for these policies almost universally cite worries that national chain firms are displacing local, independent firms. Having estimated a dynamic model, I
can examine this counterfactual directly.
The counterfactual question is what is the number of firms and distribution of firm qualities that would result if limitations on chain hotels in Texas had existed over the past decade? In simulating the distribution of firm types with limitations on chains, it is also possible to partially resolve the ambiguous effects of chain expansion on welfare.
Since there is strong evidence that chains earn higher revenue after conditioning on firm characteristics, one might think they have a negative effect on consumers. But this chain premium is increasing in quality, and without the ability to signal quality that a chain affiliation provides, fewer firms might enter at higher quality levels. Our model allows us to simulate the distribution of firm quality without chains to test this.
Solving dynamic industry game models amounts to solving for a fixed point of a large system of non-linear equations. This is too complex to solve analytically and so must be done computationally. To do this I begin by forming firm profits for firm types in all market states using the estimated cost and revenue parameters discussed previously. I then solve for a fixed point in firm value functions and policy functions using the stochastic algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (2001) . With firm policy functions governing exit, entry and type choice, I can then simulate the behavior of firms in different markets and consider the effects of different policies regulating firm conduct.
I start at the true firm distribution in year 2000 and forward simulate 11 years. I repeat this many times and for many markets as a policy benchmark and as an informal test of the performance and fit of the model. In Table 14 , I compare the true 2012 firm distribution with the results of model simulations and find that the model performs well, only slightly overestimating the number of one and two star chain firms. I then test two potential policies.
First, a policy capping chain firms to be no more than 50% of the market, and second, a policy banning all new entry by chains. I choose these policies in part to avoid the question of how policies would treat existing chain firms in 2000. This also keeps the counterfactual market structure closer to being in sample. The counterfactual firm type distributions that result from these policies are shown in Table 15 There are two notable effects of the policy changes. First, while there are naturally fewer chain firms under the potential policies, there are also fewer firms total. This is true despite there being the same number of potential entrants in both scenarios. In the policy banning new chain entrants, the total number of firms in the market falls by 1.03 on average. This fall is most pronounced in the 3 star category, where the mean number of firms falls from 2.3 to .5. This is partially made up for by an increase in the number of 1 star firms. The same result is seen, albeit with smaller magnitudes, in the policy capping chains at 50%.
Given the empirical results presented earlier, this is not a surprise. The chain revenue premium is increasing in quality, and so the option of chain affiliation increases the incentives of new entrants to open a high quality firm. Restrictions on chain affiliation reduce both the total number of firms and their average quality level.
Conclusion
The rapid growth of chains over the past few decades has attracted the attention of policymakers and economists in a variety of fields. This paper addresses the question of why firms organize into chains at all. It uses high quality firm level data on chain and independent firms in the hotel industry to test the main hypotheses of why chains are successful.
Reduced form analysis of firm revenues show that chains earn a significant premium, and that this premium is consistent with a model of low consumer information. In particular, the chain premium declines over time, appears immediately when a firm joins a chain, and is larger for chains with more outlets. In addition, among firms with large numbers of online reviews, the premium essentially disappears. Altogether the data support the view that chain firms enjoy market power that derives from having a known reputation in settings where consumers have little information about product quality.
In contrast, structural estimates of firm costs suggest chains derive no efficiency advantage from their affiliation. The cost estimates correspond closely to survey data on operating costs and are robust across specifications. The evidence thus suggests that the growth of chains in the hotel industry results from market power and not efficiency. Each specification is a logistic regression. The dependent variable is 1 if the firm is active that period and 0 otherwise. The left column is the distribution of firm types in 2011 in the data. The right column shows the results of model simulation. For each market, the model is started at the true 2000 distribution and forward simulated 10, 000 times. 
